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The relationship between technical progress and price competition is a controversial issue in 
economics. This paper highlights the fact that investment in technical progress is an authentic 
type  of  competition  which  benefits  the  consumers  rather  than  the  industry.  This  type  of 
competition exists when the potential for technical progress, which can be incorporated by 
firms  through  investment,  is  high  enough.  Competition  is,  in  fact,  made  up  of  two 
components: A static one which is known as price or quantity competition and a dynamic one, 
the  Technical  Progress  competition  which  also  contribute  to  reduce  prices  and  increase 
quantities for consumers. Consequently, the economic factors that increase a firm’s margin do 
not  have  to  be  viewed  as  the  consumers’  enemy,  but  rather  as  an  ally,  under  specific 
conditions, because they allow higher investments in new technology by which firms increase 
their capacities and attract higher demand from consumers. This paper also underlines that, 
for a mature market, the maximum Consumer Surplus as well as Social Welfare are attained 
by  a  constant  level  of  combined  competition  which  is  only  dependent  on  the  size  of the 
market and the number of firms. The level of combined competition can be defined as the 
product of the static and the dynamic level of competition. As a consequence, the higher the 
potential of technical progress is, the lower the level of static competition must be in order to 
reach the maximum level of Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare. 
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 1  Introduction 
 
Technical progress is commonly considered, among economists, to be one of the main factors 
that leads to economic growth as Solow (1956). The relationship between technical progress 
and competition is a controversial issue in economics. Schumpeter (1934, 1950) thought that 
monopolies or highly concentrated markets were favourable to innovation due to the higher 
potential for profits as well as their economies of scale which can be used for Research and 
development. Arrow (1962), on the contrary, illustrated that a firm in competitive industry is 
more willing to innovate in a new technology than a pure monopoly because the difference of 
the profits it can earn is higher. A monopoly can increase its profits from the new technology, 
but at the expense of its profits from the old technology. This is known as the “replacement 
effect” mentioned by Tirole (1997). Moreover, there is no clear evidence whether market 
concentration  influences  innovations  more  favourably  rather  than  less.  Gilbert  (2006) 
indicates  that  this  depends  on  market  structures,  particularly  entry  barriers,  the  kind  of 
innovation, product innovation or process innovation, and issues such as intellectual property 
rights. 
In  general,  technological  progress  is  regarded  as  the  sole  outcome  of  R&D.  However, 
investments in technological progress are not investments in R&D alone, but also investments 
in production capacities which integrate technical progress. For instance, telecommunication 
networks’ operators invest in network capacities and buy new generation facilities in order to 
improve the service they deliver to their customers. They do not necessarily create the new 
technology and may not have even been involved in the R&D process that brought about the 
new technology, yet their investment allows end-users to benefit from them. 
R&D is generally regarded as a process that leads to unpredictable stochastic shocks on the 
industry  which  are  hard  to  anticipate.  This  explains  why  Schumpeterian  competition, 
according to Barney (1986), has resisted application into strategic thinking. This is also why, 
Industrial Organization models take neither the static effects (prices, product differentiation, 
market structure,…) nor the dynamic effects (innovation, new products, new technologies,…) 
into account at the same time. They separate them into different frameworks: On the one 
hand, the static competition and on the other, the dynamic competition. 
This paper will be based on the principle that investments in technical progress provide a 
means to increase production capacities (network capacities for a network operator). This 
phenomenon has become more predictable and all competitors have equal access to the new 
technologies. The aim of the paper is to focus on such a context, in order to study the strategic 
interactions among competitors which reconcile the static and the dynamic aspects into a 
single framework. 
Over time, production capacities tend to increase exponentially. Koh and Magee (2006, 2008) 
have studied the evolution of technical progress from the middle of the nineteenth century to 
the present and focused on Information technologies and Energy sectors. During this period, 
the technical progress in both sectors has increased almost exponentially. This implies an 
annual technical progress rate which is relatively steady over time even if it may vary from 
year to year. The order of magnitude is clearly higher for Information Technologies (about 20 
to 30%) than for Energy (about 3 to 6%). 
The power of technical progress in the Information Technologies highlights the relevance of 
the  recognition  of  the  dynamic  point  of  view  particularly  in  this  sector.  This  paper  is 
organized as follows: 
Section  1  is  the  present  introduction,  Section  2  is  the  theoretical  model  that  studies  the 
strategic interaction from the static and dynamic points of view. It reveals an inverted U 
relationship between price competition level and Consumer Surplus or Social Welfare like 
Aghion and al (2002). Price competition encourages firms to invest yet, at the same time, it 
reduces their investment capabilities. The higher the technical progress rate is, the lower the level  of  price  competition  must  be  to  maximize  Welfare.  As  a  result,  technical  progress 
appears  as a type of competition comparable to price competition. The level of technical 
progress  competition  is  characterized  by  the  technical  progress  rate.  Competition  is 
characterized  by  two  components,  on  the  one  hand  is  the  static  aspect  which  is  price 
competition,  and  on  the  other  hand  is  the  dynamic  aspect  which  is  Technical  progress 
competition. Section 3 is a discussion that develops the idea that there is an optimal social 
level of competition comprised of price competition, number of firms and technical progress 
competition. An increase in a certain type of competition leads to a proportional decrease of 
the other kinds of competition in order to maintain the optimal social level. Section 4 is the 
conclusion and the policy implications of the model. 
 
2  The model 
 
Firms compete in price. They invest in technical progress in order to improve the value of 
their product. The duopoly case will be considered first, to focus on the strategic interactions 
then we shall generalize the model to N firms.  
First let us consider the model from the static point of view. 
 
2.1  Static model of duopoly 
 
The two firms compete in price. A total of n consumers are uniformly distributed along a line 
whose length is normalized to one. Firm 1 is located at the extreme left and Firm 2 at the 
opposite end. Each consumer desires one unit of a good. We assume that the consumers’ 
values of both firms’ products v1 and v2 are high enough to assure a complete coverage of the 
market. A consumer located at a distance x from the extreme left incurs a disutility of hx if he 
buys  from  Firm  1  at  price  p1  and  h(1-x)  if  he  buys  from  Firm  2  at  price  p2.  h  is  the 
transportation cost. We assume that both firms have an equal marginal cost c. 
Each firm maximizes its profit, and there is a Nash equilibrium where the market share of 
firm i ;  { } 2 , 1 , Î j i , is: 
h
v v j i
i 6 2
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+ = s           (1) 
(see annex 1) 
With the condition  h v v j i 3 £ -  to remain in a duopoly with  0 ³ i s  
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And each firm earns: 
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The consumer surplus cs is the difference between consumer utility and price: 
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Consumer Surplus, as well as Welfare, decreases with the transportation cost h.  
Notice that if both firms propose an equal consumers’ value for their offer, they will earn the 
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h can also be read into a coefficient of differentiation between the offers of both firms. When 
h = 0, the offers of both firms are perfect substitutes and the more h increases, the more the 
offers of both firms are differentiated. This differentiation allows firms to make higher profits. 
However, when  v v v = = 2 1 , h also represents the margin. Competition is all the more fierce 
the lower h is. 
h
1
can be regarded here as a proxy for the intensity of competition. 
From this static point of view, we can notice that Consumer Surplus as well as Welfare are 
both at their maximum level for perfect competition when h = 0. Competition causes prices to 
decrease and Consumer Surplus and Welfare to increase. 
The outcome may vary when we take the dynamic point of view into account. 
 
2.2  Dynamic model of duopoly 
 
Let us assume that at time t0, both firms sell a good that all consumers value to the same 
degree  v v v = = 2 1 . Each firm can reinvest a part of its profit in technical progress in order to 
improve the consumers’ value of its offer. This investment can be a R&D investment or an 
investment in the production capacities which allows technical progress to integrate the good. 
For instance, an Internet Service Provider can invest in network capacities by buying new 
generation devices which improve the bandwidth and the available bit rate of its subscribers. 
This investment Ii increases the consumers’ value of the product from vi at time t0 to  vi+V(Ii) 
at time  t1 . 
V(Ii) represents the response of the consumers’ value to the investment in technical progress. 
Let us assume function V(Ii) is increasing and concave and when there is no investment there 
is no improvement of consumer value. V(0) = 0. 
 At  time t = t0, firms invest. What is the amount Ii firm i has to invest in order to maximize its 
profit if firm j invest Ij? 
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The investment Ii at t0 is worth  ) 1 ( r + i I  at time t1. r is the discount rate. 
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Firm i tries to maximize its dynamic profit, the first order condition leads to 
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Firms i and j face the same constraints, therefore they will react similarly, thus  I I I j i = =  
and  ) ( ) ( ) ( I V I V I V j i = = . Finally:  
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Since V(I) is concave, 
dI
I dV ) (
is strictly decreasing. Consequently, there are two possibilities 
according to the value of 
dI
dV ) 0 (
 in comparison to
n
) 1 ( 3 r +
. (figure 1) 
If 
n dI
dV ) 1 ( 3 ) 0 ( r +
< there is no solution to equation 11. The response of the consumers’ value 
to the investment in technical progress is too low. The investment is too costly compared to 




dV ) 1 ( 3 ) 0 ( r +
³  there is a solution to equation 11 and therefore, there is a value of 
investment I
* that maximizes dynamic profit. The response of the consumers value to the 
investment in technical progress is strong enough, firms incentive to invest is sufficient and so 
both firms will invest an amount of I
* in technical progress such that: 
n dI
I dV ) 1 ( 3 ) (
* r +
=  and 
we can define  ) , (
* n I r as a function depending on nothing but the discount rate r and the 
number of customers n. 
2.3  Discussion 
 We can notice that I
* is independent of h, which is linked to the level of price competition. 
The level of price competition has no influence on the amount I
* firms are encouraged to 
invest. However, it can have an influence on the capability of firms to have this amount at 
their disposal. 
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The discount rate, r , represents the valuation of the present time in comparison to the future. 
The higher r is, the more the present is important in comparison to the future, and then the 
less investment is encouraged. As a result, I
* decreases when r increases. 
However, the number of customers’ n encourages investment, because the willingness to pay 
of each consumer increases thanks to the investment.  In figure 1, we notice that the line 
n
) 1 ( 3 r +
increases  with  r and  then  crosses  the
dI
I dV ) (
  curve  for  a  lower  value  of  I
*.  By 
contrast, it decreases with n and therefore crosses the 
dI
I dV ) (
curve for a higher value of I
*. 
 
2.4  Reinvestment rate 
 
Firms try to invest the exact amount I
* in technical progress each time. When they earn a 
profit higher than I
*, they have no problem doing it, but when their profit is not sufficient, 
they cannot invest enough unless they resort to an external source of financing. Such sources 
of financing, in the long run, are costly and not sustainable in this particular model, because 
firms’ profits and financing needs to remain steady. Firms will never be able to pay back such 
external sources of financing. In this paper, we assume that firms resort only to self-financing. 
Let us assume that a is the reinvestment rate such that 
* I = ap  
If 
* I ³ p then  1 £ a . Firms do not need to reinvest all their profits.  
If 
* I < p , we should obtain  1 > a , but this is not possible because firms resort only to self-
financing which creates the condition  1 £ a . In such a case,  1 = a , and firms reinvest all the 
profit in technical progress even if it is not sufficient to attain I
*. This investment in technical 
I* I* I* I* I II I
n
) 1 ( 3 r +
dI
I dV ) (
invest    firms    two The   
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figure1progress, which is lower than expected, will slow down the rate of improvement of the goods 




















Figure 2 represents the reinvestment rate a according to the differentiation parameter h which 
also represents the margin here. When the margin increases, profits increase as well.  
2
n h












a  the optimal level of investment in 
technical progress I







< ⇒ < p in  such  a  case,  1 = a .  The  optimal  level  of  investment  in  technical 
progress I
* is not reached even if firms reinvest all their profits. 
 
2.5  Prisoner’s dilemma 
 
When we consider the global outcome, if technical progress is strong enough to incite firms to 
invest, both firms will have invested the same amount, and likewise they will have increased 
the consumers’ willingness to pay for their offer. As a result, neither of them has acquired any 
competitive advantage, therefore, at time t1, they still earn the same profit as at time t0, in spite 
of their financial effort. Whereas the situation is quite unchanged for firms at the end of the 
game, customers, on the other hand, have gained a lot of Surplus thanks to technical progress. 
Thus firms’ investments have not been advantageous for them, but rather for the customers. In 
this respect, firms would be better off not investing, however they made the choice to invest, 
because  not  investing  is  very  risky  in  the  event  that  their  competitor  does.  Fear  of  the 
competitor urges them to invest. This is the consequence of competition. In fact, investment in 
technical  progress,  as  a  result,  is  a  competitive  behaviour.  The  amount  of  investment  I
* 
depends on the strength of technical progress. The higher the latter is, the higher I
* is. The 
level of competition through technical progress is then determined by I
*.
 The competitive 
behaviour through technical progress appears in the prisoner’s dilemma firms are confronted 
with.  
The table below (table 1) summarizes this dilemma and indicates the gains each firm earns 
whether it invests or not according to its rival’s behaviour. 
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Equation 12 leads to 
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This inequality is checked for all  0 > I , because V(I) is concave and  0 ) 0 ( = V  (see annex 3). 
Firms face a prisoner’s dilemma since the technical progress is dynamic enough to incite them 
to invest. That is to say if  
n dI
dV ) 1 ( 3 ) 0 ( r +
³  
 
A prisoner’s dilemma can incite firms to cooperate if the game is repeated. This incentive 
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Firm 1 Firm 1 Firm 1 Firm 1
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table 1Equation 14 shows that the incentive to cooperate increases with h and decreases with I
* . 
Both  kinds  of  competition,  Price  competition  and  Technical  progress  competition  tend  to 
reduce incentive to cooperate. 
 
3  Consumer Surplus and Welfare in dynamics 
 
In the dynamic model, investment in technical progress, even if it has no impact on firms’ 
profits it has a great impact on Consumer Surplus and Welfare. Improvement of firms’ goods 
increases  consumers’  willingness  to  pay.  As  both  firms’  prices  remain  unchanged,  the 
Consumer Surplus, i.e. the difference between the price and the consumers’ willingness to 
pay, increases.  
Social Welfare, defined as the sum of Consumer Surplus and firms’ profits, increases too 
because the firms’ profits remain steady, whereas Consumer Surplus increases.  
Investment in technical progress increases the consumers’ value of firms’ products. 
Let us assume that at t0 this value is v0, at time t1 this value is upgraded to  ) ( 0 1 I V v v + = . At 
time tu, it becomes  ) ( 0 I V u v vu + =  and consumer surplus 
4
5h
c v cs u u - - =  (equation 6). 
 
The dynamic Consumer Surplus, CS is the discounted sum of static consumer surplus over 
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(see annex 4) 
From this equation, contingent on the level of price competition, the variations of Consumer 







< ⇒ < p ,    firms  reinvest  all  their  profit  then 
2
h n
I = .  In  such  a  case,  I 
depends on the margin, h.When the level of price competition decreases, h increases and the 
static consumer surplus decreases. However, at the same time, the investment capabilities of 







³ ⇒ ³ p , firms can attain the optimal level of investment I
* therefore
* I I = . 
In  such  a  case,  I  no  longer  depends  on  the  margin,  h.  Only  the  static  portion  remains 
dependent on h. Therefore, while h increases, CS decreases. (figure 3) 
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(see annex 4) 


















































We can prove that 
* *
* 2
W CS h h
n
I
< < (see annex 5) 





= , in other words for p =
* I . 
 
3.1  Law of maximum Welfare conservation 
 
Let  us  denote 
h
1
= g ,  g    represents  the  substitutability  coefficient  between  firms  which 
represents the indicator of the level of price competition. 
 
Maximum Consumer Surplus and Welfare are achieved for 
 
n I =












figure 3g  represents price competition and I
* technical progress competition. Equation 18 highlights 
that the product of those two kinds of competition is constant and equal to the market’s size n 
divided by 2. Now 2 is the number of firms. We can prove that equation 18 can be generalized 
to N firms (see annex 6) and becomes: 
 
n I N =
* g           (19) 
 
Equation 19 means that the product of the two kinds of competition and the number of firms 
must be equal to the market’s size in order to maximize Consumer Surplus as well as Welfare. 
This  also  means  that  the  two  kinds  of  competition  play  a  symmetrical  and  inversely 
proportional role in Welfare maximization. The higher I
* is, the lower g  must be. If I
* is 
multiplied by a coefficient, g must be divided by the same coefficient in order to maintain 
Consumer Surplus and Welfare at their maximum level. 
Eventually, Competition is composed of both types of competition, Price competition can be 
regarded as the static component of competition and technical progress competition as the 
dynamic component of competition. The number of firms N reinforces competition in both of 
its components. 
The level of competition which leads to the social optimum is proportional to the market’s 
size and inversely proportional to the number of firms. For a given market’s size n and a 
given number of firms N. The socially optimal level of competition is constant and not nil. It 
is equal to the product of its static and its dynamic components 
* I g . (figure 4) 
I
* depends on the strength of the technical progress, it is an exogenous parameter, upon which 
policy makers have no hold. However, they have a slight influence over the static parameter 
of competition g . That is why the author of this paper believes policy makers should strive to 
adapt the static component to the dynamic one. For  example, the dynamic component of 
competition is particularly high in the Information technology sector according to the Koh and 
Magee  (works  2006,  2008).  This  high  level  of  technical  progress  suggests  that  the  static 
























































































































































Optimal level of  Optimal level of  Optimal level of  Optimal level of 
competition competition competition competition curves curves curves curves
Over competition Over competition Over competition Over competition





Dynamic component of competition Dynamic component of competition Dynamic component of competition Dynamic component of competition




In figure 4, competition is represented by its two components which correspond to the two 
axes: I
* and g .  
When competition falls below the curve  * NI
n
= g  , the optimal level of competition is not 
attained, because there is not enough competition, this is “under-competition”.  
When it is located above the curve, the optimal level of competition is not attained either 
because there is too much competition, this is the “over-competition”. 
 
When  the  technical  progress  is  not  dynamic  enough,  firms  are  not  encouraged  to  invest 
0
* = I . In such a case, the optimal level of competition is attained when N or g tend towards 
infinity, in other words, for a state of perfect competition. The result of the static model is 
found again. When the dynamic competition is missing, only the static component remains. 
The corollary is that when the static competition is nil, the dynamic component should tend 
towards infinity. This also would be a state of perfect competition in its dynamic version. 
However, this is a theoretical point of view because firms’ resources and consequently I
* are 




; W CS h h
n
NI
N < < "  can be proven (see annex 7)  
3.2  Sustainability of competition 
 
When there is over-competition,  n I N >
* g , firms cannot sustain the amount of investment I
* 
in technical progress. They invest as much as they can of a certain amount of money,
* I I <  
such that  n I N = g . However, they are encouraged to invest more. This leads to a tension on 
the  parameters  N  and  g. Firms  are  incited  to  lower  N,  market  concentration,  or 
g, product substitutability, in order to reduce the tension. 
In  case  of  under-competition  n I N <
* g .  Firms  can  invest  I
*  without  reinvesting  all  their 
profits. This situation is sustainable even if Consumer Surplus and Welfare are not optimized. 
There can be an opportunity for new market entry if  ( ) n I N £ +
* 1 g . However, when the 
market strays from the social optimum, Consumer Surplus and Welfare decrease more slowly 
into the side of “under-competition” than into the side of “over-competition”. Indeed, the 
slope of CS and W is steeper for 
* NI h < than for
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 (see annex 8) 
 
3.3  Performance unit price (Hedonic price) 
 
The improvement of firms’ products at a constant price leads to a price decrease for a constant 
level of performance.  
Let us assume that performance is K0 at time t0 and Ku at time tu . Firms invest an amount of 











I t           (20) 
 
Notice  that,  at  the  end  of  the  game,  the  situation  of  firms  is  unchanged,  even  though 
Consumer Surplus and Welfare has increased. The scenario is repeated each time and firms’ 
investment remain constant, (inflation is not taken into account). The technical progress rate 
also remains constant. This is consistent with the MIT works of Koh and Magee (2006, 2008). 
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Let us assume that consumers’ values for firms’ products is logarithmically related to their 
performance. This is a common assumption which has been confirmed by Peter Reichl, Bruno 
Tuffin and Raimund Schatz (2010). Therefore, it can be deduced that: 
 
( ) ) ( 1 ln ) ln( ) ln( 0 I u K Ku t + + =  
 
with  ) ln( ); ln( 0 0 K v K v u u = = and as a result  ( ) ) ( 1 ln ) ( I I V t + =  
 
The  price  of  the  goods  remains  constant  h c p + =   but  the  price  of  a  performance  unit, 
u P decreases. The price of a performance unit at time tu is the price of the good divided by the 
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Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of performance price over time according to the level of the 
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*
1 2I h <
* 2I h=
Perfect Perfect Perfect Perfect static static static static
competition competition competition competition 0 = h c
time time time time
figure 5 
Under conditions of perfect static competition, the unit price of performance is lower than 
under conditions of imperfect static competition at the beginning of the period of time, t0. If 
0 = h ;  c P u = . But the unit price of performance remains constant over time because there is 
no  dynamic  competition.  The  imperfect  static  competition  allows  the  rise  of  dynamic 
competition  that  improves  performance.  Under  imperfect  static  competition, 
performance, u K increases  exponentially  over  time  and  therefore,  the  unit  price  of 
performance decreases exponentially as well. The fastest and lowest decrease is attained for 
* 2I h = under  optimal  investment,
* I I = .  For 
* 2I h < ,  investment  is  not  optimal  and  the 
technical progress rate is lower than expected. Performance increases more slowly and then 
the unit price of performance decreases more slowly as well. For  
* 2I h > the investment is 
optimal
* I I = but  nothing  more  and  static  competition  is  inefficiently  lowered.  As  a 
consequence, the unit price of performance is higher at the beginning of the period of time 
and will remain higher over time than when 
* 2I h = . 
 
Such unit price of performance decrease has been highlighted by  Koh and Magee. Three 
examples,  the  prices  of  computer  memory,  bandwidth  and  computing  performance  have 
dramatically fallen. 
Computer memory: Price of Mbits (in US $ 2004), from $420 in 1952 on a magnetic tape, to 
$8.75 10
-4 in 2004 on an optical disk. 
Bandwidth: Price of Kbps/km (in US$ 2004) from $2.136 billion in 1858 by telegraph, to 
$440.41 in 1951 by TAT1 (undersea cable) and $3.04 10
-5 in 2002 by Apollo (undersea cable). 
Computing performance: Price of the instruction per second capacity (in US$ 2004), from 
$1000 in 1951 with UNIVAC_I to $8.5 10
-9 in 2004 with Athlon 63 3800. 
 
Due to the fact that computer component prices are decreasing, the hedonic price index of 
computers (of comparable performance) is also decreasing in France as well as in United 
States and figure 6 illustrates that the evolution of the index is quite similar. 
   
  France (Insee)       United state (Department of labour) 
        figure 6 
 
However, even if the hedonic prices of computers have rapidly fallen, the average price of a 
PC has decreased much more slowly. The graph below (figure 7) illustrates a year by year 
comparison of the price variation rate of PC (black curve), the hedonic price index (grey 
curve), and the performance improvement (white curve). 
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      Source Insee Arthaut (2006) 
 
      figure 7 
 
Performance evolution is the difference between the evolution of the hedonic price and the 
evolution  of  the  average  price of a PC. The slow decrease of the average price of  a PC 
compared to the stability of  the price used in the model above, arise from the growth of the 
PC  market  which  is  not  totally  mature  yet  even  in  the  OECD  countries  such  as  France. 
Indeed, the economy of scale allows the PC industry to lower prices. 
Furthermore, we can notice the dramatic acceleration of technical progress from 1997 to 2000 
which coincides with the Internet bubble. The investments in technical progress were very 
important during this period. Investments exceeded the financial capacities of the industry 
which was not sustainable in the long run. After 2000 the rate of technical progress decreased 
and fell heavily below the pre-bubble level. 
 
The  following  example,  Internet  access  in  France,  shows  a  quasi  stable  price  of  internet 
access with an exponential decrease of the hedonic price index (figure 8). 
 




























Source: Author appraisal from ARCEP and Enov Research data 




Internet  Service  Providers’  investments  in  network  capacities  in  order  to  implement  the 
technical progress allowed them to propose more and more internet bit rate connectivity to 
their subscribers. In the same period of time, the static competition on the market tended to decrease as time 
went on, as illustrated by the increase of the Herfindahl index for the corresponding period of 
time. Therefore the dramatic fall in the price of a Mb/s is more due to technical progress 
rather than price competition. (figure 9) 
 
 
Prices and Herfindahl index evolution 













      figure 9 
 
Figure 9 highlights a positive correlation, 20%, between the Internet access price and the 
Herfindahl Index but a negative correlation between the hedonic price (Mb/s price) and the 
Herfindahl Index, -35%. Static competition appears to have only a limited impact on hedonic 
prices even if it seems to have a large one on Internet access price. The primary cause of the 
decrease in the hedonic price clearly stems from technical progress. 
 
3.4  Limits of the model 
 
This model, based on a hotelling competition, presumes that the entire market is covered, this 
is  a  mature  market.  When  the  market  is  not  totally  covered,  competition  is  not  the  only 
incentive to invest, the conquest of newcomers is another one. In such a case, if there were 
increasing economies of scale, marginal costs should decrease as the number of newcomers 
increases, and prices should decrease, as illustrated in the example of Personal Computers. 
Moreover,  a  monopoly  also  has  an  incentive  to  invest  because  the  monopolist’s  margin 
increases with the consumers’ willingness to pay. 
Nevertheless, in case of imperfect competition, incentive to invest to gain newcomers tends to 
vanish  when  the  market  approaches  maturity.  Also,  in  the  end,  thanks  to  the  constant 
improvement of the performance of a good, a market always becomes mature. 
  
4  Conclusion 
 
Technical  progress  improves  the  services  and  goods  that  firms  provide  and  increases 
consumers’ willingness to pay. In mature markets, this improvement essentially benefits the 
customers. Indeed, competition, more precisely, the fear of the competitors, urges firms to 
invest in technical progress without increasing their margin. 
Competition has two components:  a static one, known as price competition, and a dynamic 
one, known as technical progress competition. When technical progress potential goes beyond 
a certain threshold, the investment in technical progress becomes profitable and the dynamic component  of  the  competition  appears.  When  the  technical  progress  potential  is  not  high 
enough, investment in technical progress is not profitable and the competition has only its 
static component. 
The intensity of dynamic competition is determined by the amount of investment firms are 
encouraged to invest. This amount is independent of the level of static competition, it depends 
solely on the potential technical progress of the industry. This potential is particularly high in 
the information technologies. For a given number of firms, the maximum level of Consumer 
Surplus  as  well  as  Social  Surplus  is  attained  for  a  constant  product  of  the  two  kinds  of 
competition.  This  competition  product  multiplied  by  the  number  of  firms  is  equal  to  the 
market size: Equation 19  n I N =
* g .  
When the competition product is higher, the market faces a structure of “over-competition”. 
This over-competition structure is not sustainable in the long run and finally firms invest only 
the maximum amount they can, but that lowers the rate of technical progress. 
When the competition product is lower, the market faces a structure of “under-competition”. 
This under-competition structure is sustainable. It lowers the level of Consumer Surplus a 
little, but to a lesser extent than “over-competition”. Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare 
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5  Annexes 
5.1  Annex 1 
 
Utility for a consumer located at x to purchase respectively firm 1’s and firm 2’s  goods is: 
 
hx p v U - - = 1 1 1   
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Firm i’s profit is  i i i c p s p ) ( - =  
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And as a result  h c p v v p i i j j - - + - = 2  
Same manner from the profit of firm j   j j j c p s p ) ( - =  We can write  h c p v v p j j i i - - + - = 2  
Now we replace  i p  in the expression of  j p  and  j p  in the expression of  i p  

















As the result we obtain equation (1) 
h
v v j i
i 6 2
1 -
+ = s  
5.2  Annex 2 
 
Let us break down the equation 12 into three inequalities 
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If  0 > I  the second inequality is checked. 
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The sum of inequalities 1) and 3) leads to 
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5.3  Annex 3 
 


























































































































































) (  for I > 0 5.4  Annex 4: Calculation of Dynamic Consumer Surplus an Welfare 
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 This is equation 16. 
 
Likewise, dynamic Welfare can be deduced from static Welfare, equation 7  )
4
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 This is equation 17. 
 
 
5.5  Annex 5: Proof of 
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5.6  Annex 6: Generalization to N firms 
 
Let us consider a N firms’ model of price competition. Each firm is differentiated from the others “à la 
Hotelling”. Let assume v1, v2, ….., vN the consumers’ values for respectively firm 1,2,…,N product. 
Whatever  { } N j i ,..., 2 , 1 , Î  we assume that consumers are regularly shared on lines named (i,j) where 
firm i is located at one end and firm j at the other. A total of n consumers are uniformly distributed 
along each (i,j)line whose length is normalized to one. A consumer located at point x on the line (i,j) 
incurs a disutility of hx if he buys from firm i and h(1-x) if he buys from firm j. 
The ratio of consumers which purchase from firm i is: 
 
h
p v p v j j i i
ij 2 2
1 + - -
+ = s  
When  there  are  N  firms,  there  are 
2
) 1 ( - N N
  braces  (i,j)    where  j i ¹ .  This  means  there  are 
2
) 1 ( - N N





consumers on each line. 
Firm i appears in  ) 1 ( - N braces. 
 


















































































Let us assume that each firm incurs the same production cost c 
 
Firm i’s profit is:  i i i q c p ) ( - = p  
 







, this leads to 
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We can check this when N=2 and equation 3 is obtained again. 
 
If all firms have an equal consumers’ valuation for their good  v v v v N = = = = L 2 1  then: 
N
h n
N = = = = = p p p p L 2 1  
The generalization of equation 9 becomes: 
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The first order condition leads to: 
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 . It can be observed that when  N=2 equation 11 is obtained again. 
In such a case, 
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 and maximum Consumer Surplus and 
Welfare are reached when: p =
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5.7  Annex 7 Generalization of annex 4 
Is the equation 
* *
*
W CS h h
n
NI
< < always true whatever N ? 
When  v v v v N = = = = L 2 1 Consumer Surplus and Welfare do not depend on the number of firms 
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 and yet it is known that 
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* * lim lim  which means  
 
that CS(NI
*) decreases faster when h is a little too low rather than if it is a little too high. 
 
A fortiori 
4 4 1 ln ) 1 ( 2
















+ ® - ®
* * lim lim  
 
 
5.9  Annex 9: 
 
The chart below indicates the consumers’ internet bit rate in France, source (Enov research) 
 
Bit Rate S2 2004 S1 2005 S2 2005 S1 2006 S2 2006 S1 2007 S2 2007 S1 2008
>8Mbts/s 1% 9% 14% 16% 15% 18% 15%
3-8Mbts/s 2% 8% 13% 15% 17% 17% 20% 21%
2Mbts/s 3% 13% 16% 16% 13% 12% 11% 7%
1Mbts/s 23% 24% 16% 15% 18% 19% 15% 13%
512 Kbts/s and less 60% 37% 27% 21% 16% 11% 8% 7%  
 
This leads to the author’s following appraisal of the average internet bit rate (see graph below): 
















The Herfindahl index has been calculated (by the author) from the market shares (revenues) of the 
operators given by Enov research. 
 
S2 2004 S1 2005 S2 2005 S1 2006 S2 2006 S1 2007 S2 2007 S1 2008
Herfindahl index 2407 2447 2426 2255 2597 2644 2689  
 
Whereas, the number of connection and the revenues comes from ARCEP in the following chart: 
 
S2 2004 S1 2005 S2 2005 S1 2006 S2 2006 S1 2007 S2 2007 S1 2008
Connections (millions) 5,5 7,3 8,5 10,5 11,8 13,7 14,8 16,3
Revenues (€ millions) 425 527 599 722 785 949 1021 1128  
 